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Abstract
Virtualization is not a new technology, but has recently experi-
enced a resurgence of interest among industry and research. New
products and technologies are emerging quickly, and are being de-
ployed with little considerations to security concerns. It is vital to
understand that virtualization does not improve security by default.
Hence, any aspect of virtualization needs to undergo constant security
analysis and audit. Virtualization is a changeable and very dynamic
field with an uncertain outcome. In this paper we outline the security
model of hypervisors and illustrate the significance of ongoing secu-
rity analysis by describing different state of the art threat models.
Finally, we provide recommendations and design considerations for a
more secure virtual infrastructure.
1 Introduction
Virtual machines (VMs) offer many benefits for data-centers, developers as
well as consumers. They provide a vast amount of flexibility, as deploy-
ment and handling is similar to that of handling a single file. VMs promise
to increase the utilization of servers, whilst at the same time cutting down
administration and operational cost. However, with the ever increasing pop-
ularity of modern virtualization techniques, there is a corresponding increase
in the threat level.
Many vendors are aggressively pushing their products into the market
trying to get their share of the business. Oracle announced their Xen based
hypervisor (a synonym for Virtual Machine Monitor or VMM) in November
2007 [1]. Microsoft will be giving away their own hypervisor in 2008 for less
than $30 [2]. Sun made their Xvm products, based on the Xen hypervisor,
available in late 2007 [3]. At the same time, many organizations are already
migrating their physical servers to virtual ones. Without careful consider-
ation, this could lead to unforeseen behavior, and undermine security and
availability.
However, virtualization has the potential to fundamentally change the
way computing resources are consumed. New features are often implemented
and new products rolled out before security issues are properly considered or
even understood. This article therefore seeks to provide an updated insight
into some of the current security issues, and to identify new threat scenarios.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First we review and
discuss related work in section 2. In section 3 we outline the security base
of modern hypervisors and investigate how the use of a hypervisor impacts
the overall system security. In section 4 we explain the importance of virtual
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machine detection for security. We provide an updated view of potential
threats in section 5. In section 6 we conclude and provide recommendations
to strengthen virtual security in section 7. Finally, we discuss future work in
section 8.
2 Related Work
Security aspects of virtualization has been an ongoing field of research ever
since the technology emerged in the 1960’s. One of the first security analyses
was carried out by Madnick and Donovan in the early 1970’s [4]. Since then
researchers have been investigating the various security benefits and threats
of virtualization. Some papers have documented the use of Virtual Machines
for malware analysis [5],[6]. This has also generated new thinking amongst
malware designers, who are now trying to hide their malicious behavior while
they suspect being inside a virtual machine. Consequently, the ability to
detect the presence of a virtual machine is constantly undergoing research
[7],[8]. The combination of techniques such as trusted computing and the
isolation provided by different virtualization technologies are another popular
field of research. Applications range from enhancing Grid security [9],[10] to
embedded car to car communication [11].
A security analysis of virtual machines was published in 2005 [12], and
more recently the vulnerabilities of virtualized environments have been stressed
by [13]. This has provided a sophisticated introduction to the security aspects
of virtualized environments. However, past work on virtualization security
has often focused on detection; or exploiting a specific virtualization product,
implementation or design; rather then identifying the more general threats
to virtualization itself. This is what we seek to do in the following.
3 Security Anatomy
The reasons to use virtualization are diverse. The main security goal, how-
ever, is the provision of a strong separation of resources being used by vir-
tualized entities. Thus, a consumer of a resource does not know – and does
not need to know – where or how this resource is implemented. In this paper
our focus is on security, therefore we begin differentiating between security
provided by virtualization technologies and security for the hypervisor itself.
Security provided by hypervisors is based on their ability to strongly
isolate processes from each other. In an x86 architecture, once a malicious
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party has access to ring 0, the most privileged mode of operation, there is
no limitation to what it is authorized to do. It can read, write and modify
any data in memory or harddisk. Numerous approaches to process isolation
have been developed, such as Jails, Chroot, JAVA or SELinux. However,
some difficulties – such as the in-depth knowledge required to handle the
complex configuration process of SELinux, or performance issues of JAVA –
have prevented these techniques from being widely used.
The problem of weak process isolation is further exacerbated by legacy
CPU architectures which fail to provide fine grained access restrictions to
memory or busses. Features, mostly added for performance reasons, allow
any device to bypass the CPU and thus any kind of control mechanism. New
technologies for the x86 architecture promise to mitigate this problem. In-
tel’s VT and AMD Pacifica offer a new set of security and virtualization
based features. Even though they are not compatible with each other, their
principles are the same: adding support for virtualization and providing a
more fine grained access control to hardware resources.
Security for hypervisors has different aspects depending on the appli-
cation. The work mentioned in section 2 has already discussed the specific
security concerns of different hypervisors. The hypervisor is different to past
software sandboxing techniques, as it addresses isolation on a more rudi-
mentary level. Rather than isolate processes, the hypervisor isolates whole
operating systems. Each operating system is then responsible for its own
security mechanisms. The hypervisor handles access to the privileged part of
the hardware and provides each isolated guest the illusion of running directly
on dedicated hardware. If a malicious party manages to compromise one vir-
tual system, it still can’t access resources used by different virtual guests or
the host system.
While the code base of a Virtual Machine Monitor such as Xen is rel-
atively small (i.e. tens of thousand lines of code) incompatible hardware
virtualization support of AMD and Intel will result in some extra code being
added into Xen. Consequently, this will result in a different set of binaries.
In general, less code means fewer bugs, thus fewer potential security flaws.
Furthermore, the smaller codebase also allows a much higher assurance level.
The team of J. McDermott et. al. are working on a high robustness hyper-
visor called xenon [14, 15] to fulfill the requirements of a strong EAL 5/6
criteria. They are intending to achieve this by, sacrificing features and sim-
plifying code as well as separating policy-enforcing code.
An alternative approach towards strong isolation and untrusted ker-
nel code can be achieved through a microkernel or an exokernel architecture
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[16]. A microkernel itself only implements basic methods necessary to pro-
vide inter-process-communication, thread and address space management.
Recently, the L4 microkernel has been heavily discussed as a potential hy-
pervisor [17]. From a security perspective, a microkernel based hypervisor is
an appealing approach as it promises to increase both reliability and isola-
tion. However, microkernels have to step back in terms of performance and
thus are mostly used for proof-of-concept designs and research projects.
Moreover, the granularity of isolation with a microkernel is also dependent
on the requirements and technique used. High isolation virtual systems, for
instance IBMs logical partitions (LPARs) separate virtual machines on the
hardware level. LPARs are Common Criteria EAL5 certifiable, as they pro-
vide the same level of isolation offered by dedicated hardware. Xen, VMware,
Microkernels and any other software product, rely on software partitioning to
ensure isolation. Additionally, the level of isolation for software partitioning
is very similar and mostly differs in implementation detail and performance.
A software based approach is a good compromise and offers a high amount
of flexibility, but also inflicts new security concerns.
4 Virtual Machine Detection
An important aspect of security for virtualization is the ability to detect the
presence of a virtual machine or hypervisor. From a security perspective
this information will provide valuable knowledge for further attacks. Conse-
quently, virtual machine detection has been discussed by numerous research
papers [7],[8]. Some approaches to hypervisor detection, such as localization
of the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) and Global Descriptor Table (GDT)
may not work with future virtualization hardware support of the x86 ar-
chitecture. However, identifying a virtual machine by registry string search,
vendor specific MAC addresses or looking for a virtualization support applica-
tion (i.e application responsible for clipboard management etc.) is still likely
to be reliable in the future. In particular, a VMware specific implementation
of a communication channel allows VM detection with high probability. This
communication channel may then be triggered by the guest operating system
by filling the processor register with a particular value (VMXh).
Listen et al. [7] examined different mechanisms to change VMware’s be-
havior, but results are not applicable to live systems. However, modifying
the guest operating system to use certain rootkit-like techniques to prevent
VM detection, might be useful in a hostile environment, such as honeypots or
malicious code analysis. For example, a patch provided by Kortchinsky [18]
allows honeypot specific VMware modification, whereas Kirch [19] provides
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configuration advice to defer detection.
In 2006 the hypervisor based rootkit developed by security analyst Joanna
Rutkowska [20] created a lot of attention. This was mainly because it was
targeting new software and hardware techniques such as Windows Vista and
AMDs Pacificia, however, it also targeted a long feared threat – undetectable
malware. This stealth property was based on the fact, that the malware
could be executed as a hypervisor and thus run underneath the operating
system. This certainly makes detection even for experienced users more
difficult, but not impossible. First of all, there will be a mapping between
physical hardware and the virtual interfaces, which the operating system will
see. Secondly, the consumption of resources such as CPU time and memory
will create an anomaly on the system. Those anomalies will also be reflected
in latency and timing characteristics. More importantly this technique allows
the detection of all hypervisors, and not only the proposed malware.
Preventing hypervisor detection is a double edged sword. On the one
hand it could prevent malware from detecting that it is running inside a vir-
tual machine, on the other hand it could prevent an operating system from
detecting that it is running in a hostile environment.
5 Threat Analysis
Virtualization is a very dynamic field, requiring ongoing research and security
analysis to identify possible threats. In this section we provide an updated
review of past security analyses [12, 21], and outline new threats which we
consider to be important.
Once an entity successfully detects being in a virtual environment, a new
scope of attack vectors apply. The type of attack coming from within the
guest operating system, is mostly dependent on the virtualization product
and version being used. However, threats from the virtual machine can be
denial of service, such as fork bombing, crashing the virtual machine, or in
the worst case VM escaping [9, 13]. A VM escape can be any type of attack,
which compromises the isolation and interacts directly with the hypervisor
or host system.
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5.1 Indirect Threats
We consider indirect threats to be those that could enable, or lead to, the
direct threats discussed in the following. For instance, an early migration
to virtualization and a specific product could led to unforeseen behavior
and undermine existing security measures. The current trend in many or-
ganizations is to hop on the virtualization bandwagon without knowing or
calculating the potential risks properly. An operator of a virtual data cen-
ter must not assume that running a virtual machine increases security by
default. Furthermore, patches and security updates have to be applied to
the guest operating system, host operating system as well as the hypervisor
itself. This could inflict hidden costs as the use of virtualization does not
decrease the operational costs by default either. Only if the virtual center
has been carefully designed and potential pitfalls mitigated, can the costs
can be reduced and security increased.
Moreover, the respective virtualization management tools have to be con-
sidered and configured carefully. As most research and programming efforts
target a secure hypervisor or virtual machine, most overlook the relevance of
the management interface. Malicious entities will not attack well known or
proven safeguards, but will search for weaknesses in the rest of the security
chain.
Future attacks or design flaws are more likely to affect management appli-
cations and tools. The difficult task of managing a virtualized infrastructure
requires a variety of different management tools. Those tools will likely be
web interfaces, for convenience, or special management consoles, for perfor-
mance reasons. Virtualization products themselves and the management of
their infrastructure is becoming an increasingly complex task, which can eas-
ily overburden administrators and executives. Thus a sophisticated security
concept could easily be undermined by a simple cross site script vulnerability
in a management interface.
Furthermore, patch management for a large numbers of guest systems
will become crucial. Applying security critical patches as soon as possible,
reduces the potential time window for an attack; at the same time it reduces
the time to thoroughly test new patches. New ideas and products [22] enable
administrators to apply guest operating patches to the hypervisor. This
allows them to apply one patch to many different machines at the same time,
as well as offering the possibility to easily rollback a patch. Unfortunately,
the same patching interface of the hypervisor could be used to transparently
apply harmful code to all guest operating systems. As a result, security
software inside a guest system might not properly detect that it has been
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compromised.
5.2 Information Leakage
We now consider the general threat of information leaking from an isolated
virtual machine. In virtualization terminology, the word ”paravirtualization”
is used for guest operating systems, which are aware that they are running
on top of a hypervisor. Such ”enlightened” guests pose a new threat since
they weaken one of the virtualization security goals namely, strong isolation.
Isolation may also be deliberately weakened to allow inter-OS communica-
tion or for performance reasons. Both these threats may result in information
leakage through covert channels. The possibility or the presence of a commu-
nication channel between guests or host system require new mechanisms to
monitor and manage them. IBMs sHype, for instance, is a hypervisor security
architecture for several hypervisors [23]. sHypes goal is to provide strong iso-
lation, policy-based sharing and communication between Virtual Machines.
It also relies on the Trusted Platform module to guarantee integrity of the
hypervisor itself. However, adding complex control mechanisms into the hy-
pervisor could lead to a more secure system design; this is, however, where
Microkernels are today.
Despite the fact that information leakage through covert channels is not
currently considered as a serious threat, it demonstrates how guest isolation
can be weakened. Liston et. al. presented a proof-of-concept application
which utilizes VMware’s communication channel to establish a channel be-
tween two virtual machines running on the same host [7]. In general, it is
difficult to prevent covert channels, but the possibility of hidden communi-
cation has a direct impact on how virtual machines with different security
requirements can be run on the same host. This is true not only for deploy-
ment, but also for operation and fault tolerance. For example, security policy
might prohibit applications classified as ”top secret”, from running together
with ”confidential” applications on the same host. Where applications from
the same security level run on one host, all data must be kept confidential on
a virtual machine unless it wishes to communicate over the network. Jaeger
et. al. [24] investigated the risk management of covert information flow in
virtual machine systems.
5.3 Integrity Violation
In addition to confidentiality, many systems require that data or applications
are not modified either deliberately or by accident. Detecting such modifi-
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cations and ensuring the integrity of a virtual image is difficult to achieve.
A virtual disk could be copied, modified and replaced within minutes. Thus
a malicious party could inject code into a disk image without the knowledge
of the legitimate owner or user. Even if the disk image is encrypted the at-
tacker could successfully implement a denial of service attack by randomly
modifying an image.
5.4 Unauthorized Access
One much extolled feature of virtualization is the ability to create snapshots
and rollback to a previous system state. This allows the user, in case of
misconfiguration, crash or data loss, to return to an earlier system state.
The snapshot includes CPU state and memory content – it is an exact copy
of the earlier system. This image can contain security information such
as login states, server tickets and credentials. This enables a new threat,
unauthorized access to restricted resources. The snapshot could be leaked,
giving an attacker the possibility to analyze an image and prepare further
attacks. A virtual machine image, including security credentials, certificates
or similar could be stolen, run and compromised from a different location.
This potentially undermines the complete company’s security concept. i.e.
allowing the thief to access the same resources, the copied system would be
granted access to. Additionally, the important randomness used for security
applications becomes worthless as a snapshot turns any operating system into
a predictable machine. This makes the system vulnerable to replay attacks.
A compromised image might also be used to fake a person’s or a company’s
identity, causing serious damage such as fraud.
A second threat of unauthorized access arises from “virtual appliances”.
These are virtual machine images that contain operating system, middle-
ware and application. Virtual appliances therefore offer easy deployability
and make it easy to try-out new applications. However such a virtual ap-
pliance may contain vulnerabilities, for example default configurations and
passwords, giving an attacker unauthorized access to system resources. In
a worst case scenario the newly installed appliance could already contain
malicious code.
5.5 Denial of Service
We have seen previously how the threat to the integrity of virtual images
also enables a Denial of Service (DoS) threat. DoS attacks themselves can
lead to a number of other threats. These threats arise from the ability of
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virtualization to allocate resources and even migrate running operating sys-
tems between hosts. This is beneficial for the management and availability
of an IT-infrastructure, but also adds a new level of complexity. A malicious
entity could therefore force the migration of a running virtual machine on to
a compromised host by performing a DoS attack on the target machine.
Moreover, as pointed out by Ramasamy [25], the reliability of a virtual-
ized system depends on the amount of concurrent virtual systems running
on the same host. However, a hardware failure or successful DoS attack on
the a host will take down all virtual machines on the platform.
5.6 Exploits
Even although VM escape has been a concern since virtualization has emerged,
no VM escape code has yet been seen in the wild. A couple of security
issues with VMware’s Workstation have however been discovered recently
[26],[27],[28],[29]. The type of attacks depend on specific software product
and version. These exploits can be used under certain circumstances to
cause the host environment to execute arbitrary code, but they require a
weak configuration or a specific user interaction (i.e. Drag & Drop). Ad-
ditionally, they target a specific VMware product and version, some of the
vulnerabilities have already been patched and it is most likely that the rest
will be patched in the near future.
Still, even if a problem with the hypervisor is not exploitable, it might
be used to crash a virtual machine. As stressed by Ormandy [13] none of
the virtual machines tested in this work was found to be robust enough
to withstand simple I/O fuzzy testing. Further, Ormandy presents multi-
ple exploitable flaws in some popular closed and open-source virtualization
products.
The open source hypervisor, Xen, uses native xeno-aware operating sys-
tem drivers in favor of portability and flexibility, VMware provides guest op-
erating system drivers for their standardized interfaces. Drivers have direct
access to the hardware and thus contain a considerable amount of untrusted
and privileged code. Therefore poorly written drivers pose a threat for ev-
ery computer system. For instance, a heap overflow in Xen’s NE2000 driver
has been discovered by Ormandy [13], which allows a malicious entity within
a guest operating system to execute arbitrary code on the hosting system [30].
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6 Conclusion
Security aspects of modern virtualization are still in an early stage of evolu-
tion. Moreover, this is a highly dynamic and changeable field, which requires
continuous research and evaluation. New products and technologies are con-
stantly emerging offering security solutions, as well as creating new security
problems. As a consequence this review provides an updated threat assess-
ment for virtual systems, identifying and classified several threats as well as
outlining the practical implications.
We are aware that some of these threats may seem difficult to exploit
today, however they may well be seen in real world applications in the future.
We are also aware that some threats, dealing with software issues, are based
on inherently insecure architectures such as x86. Current development of
hardware support for virtualization and access control on this architecture
promises to mitigate this problem.
But complex software as it is used in virtualization will always have se-
curity issues, and care has to be taken to ensure that these issues are not
easy exploitable. Adding features for convenience and performance reasons
can easily weaken isolation or completely compromise security.
The ability to manage and monitor a virtual data center or even a single
virtual machine will become a centerpiece of future virtual infrastructures.
This will result in a complex combination of different tools from different
sources, where each tool will have its unique vulnerabilities. The hypervisor
itself is here only a small but very important piece.
7 Recommendations
Virtualization is not naturally insecure when compared to the security flaws
contained in a modern operating system. But it does not increase security
by default. It is a powerful tool to optimize existing and future IT infrastruc-
tures. However, hypervisors are as vulnerable as any other piece of software
as they become more sophisticated and more complex. Therefore it is vital
to carefully plan the virtual infrastructure. The preceding discussion allows
us to present some design considerations and recommendations:
7.1 planning
The security model should be well thought out, considering the possibility
of a potential VM escape. Thus only systems with similar security require-
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ments should be grouped together on one host. Further, the existing security
policies should be adopted and transformed, to satisfy the need of a virtu-
alized environment. This includes a suitable deployment strategy. Also it is
essential that the appropriate tools and technologies are chosen right from
the process of migration. An access control model can be enforced with a
mandatory access control such as [23] or Xen Security Modules (XSM).
7.2 configuring
The whole infrastructure should be hardened against possible attacks, be-
ginning with the host operating system, the hypervisor; and including guest
systems and the infrastructure management tools. As in every secure config-
uration, the attack surface should be reduced to a minimum by disabling un-
necessary features and functions (i.e. disable unused virtualized hardware).
Virtualization offers many benefits, but the complex interaction between the
required tools makes maintaing security a challenging and sophisticated task.
Secure VMware specific configuration recommendations have been made by
Kirch [19], Liston [7] and Ormandy [13] section V. Best practices and security
design considerations for Xen can be found at the Xen wiki [31].
7.3 managing
Exploiting the hypervisor is currently the biggest fear of the virtualization
industry, but simpler threats i.e. cross site scripting or hijacking a manage-
ment session, pose much bigger security risks. Managing access credentials
and monitoring virtual machine behavior to track anomalies as soon as they
appear is a key benefit to secure a virtual IT infrastructure. Of course, it
is vital to keep the system on a up-to-date patch level – this includes the
host system, the guest system, the hypervisor itself as well as any other
management tools involved.
8 Future Work
An active area of research is the combination of ideas and concepts from
trusted computing, with the strong isolation provided by virtualization [9],
[10],[11]. Trusted computing has the potential to improve hypervisor security
by ensuring the correct launch and integrity of any hypervisor. However, this
inflicts the question of where to start putting trust in a virtualized platform?
For instance, Xen dom0 is running in privileged mode, assuming that it is a
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correct and trustful base for all guests. Designing a new trust concept for vir-
tualized platforms provides a challenging task for future work. Additionally,
there are still unaddressed issues with the current Trusted Platform Module
design such as performance consideration and the seamless integration into
virtualized systems. Thus, IBM is currently investigating detailed solutions
for virtual TPMs [32]. Our current work incorporates a TPM based approach
to hash whole virtual disk images in a fast and secure manner.
In the future there might be dedicated hardware to securely manage and
monitor hardware resources or virtual environments. Phoenix, one of the
biggest manufacturers of PC Bioses, recently publicized their vision of a new
generation of PCs which integrates a hypervisor directly into the BIOS [33].
Furthermore, antivirus or intrusion detection will likely be installed on
the host systems to monitor concurrent virtual machines simultaneously. Ac-
cess monitoring and policy enforcing such as discussed in [23] and [34] are
other current areas of research. In Xen version 3.2 a new standardized secu-
rity framework, Xen Security Module, has been introduced. This technique
provides a basis for developing new security modules, such as access control
or intrusion detection mechanism.
Additionally, AMD’s and Intel’s implementation of hardware based vir-
tual machines have to prove their robustness under rigorous security analysis.
Due to its dynamic nature, future research in virtualization hardware and
software will require an ongoing review of vulnerabilities and a continuous
threat monitoring.
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